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This paper extends the model of Fielding (1999), which is designed to explain changes 
in investment in South Africa during the Apartheid period, by allowing a role for 
indicators of political instability and political and civil rights, as measured by 
Fedderke et al. (1999). The conclusions based on estimation of the original model are 
robust to the inclusion of the political factors, but these factors do explain some of the 
variation in investment over time. 
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Fielding (1999) presented a time-series model of South African investment for 1960-93 in 
which the aggregate capital stock in the manufacturing sector is explained by the user cost of 
capital, real wages, the scale of output and several indicators of economic uncertainty. The 
relative sizes of the estimated coefficients lead to a number of conclusions about the 
constraints facing South African investors, as well as about the relative importance of different 
types of economic uncertainty. 
  In the same year, Fedderke et al. (1999) presented time series measures of a number of 
variables designed to capture elements of social capability in South Africa over the period 
1935-97. These include indicators of political instability, political rights and civil (property) 
rights.1 It is suggested that these variables can explain some of the variation in South African 
economic performance over time, just as cross-country measures of social capability can 
explain variations in economic performance across countries (Johnson and Temple, 1998; 
Fedderke and Klitgaard, 1998). These cross-country studies suggest that social capability plays 
an important role in the growth process, but cross-country variations in social capability 
measures cannot easily be linked directly to public policy changes. This limitation is not true 
of time-series variations, so time-series models potentially have more to say that is of interest 
to the policy-maker. 
  In this paper we present an extension of the Fielding (1999) model of investment that 
includes measures of social capability from the Fedderke et al. (1999) paper. The purpose of 
this exercise is twofold: first, to determine whether the conclusions based on the original 
estimates of the investment equations are robust to the inclusion of social capability measures; 
and second, to see whether the investment data can support Fedderke et al.'s suggestion that 
time-series variations in social capability can affect economic performance in an individual 
country. 
 
2. The Revised Model 
The regression estimates presented below are revisions of the original model of the capital 
stock summarised by Fielding (1999)'s equation (14), which is: 
 
ln(kt) = Σi bi ln(kt-i) + Σj a1,j D(j) + a2 ln(c/P)t + a3 ln(w/P)t + a4 ln(g)t + a5 ln(Q)t     (1) 
 +  a6 S(1)t + a7 S(2)t + a8 S(3)t + a9 mt + a10 f(t) + ut 
 
k is the private manufacturing capital stock, the D(j) are seasonal dummies, c/P is the real user 
cost of capital, w/P is the real wage rate, g is the public capital stock, Q is a measure of output 
per firm, the S(.)  are indicators of uncertainty in the net returns to investment, m is an 
indicator of macroeconomic instability (in the reported regressions a long-short interest rate 
spread, [rB - rT]), f(t) is a time trend and u an i.i.d. residual. To this equation we add three 
variables from Fedderke et al. (1999): the 0-200 index of political freedom, POR (in Appendix 1 
of the paper), the 0-100 index of property rights, PRR (in Appendix 2) and the "consensus" 
index of political instability, INS (on page 24). Fedderke et al. explain the policy changes that 
led directly or indirectly to variations in the three series. We do not reproduce the explanations 
here, but note that the changes are largely policy-driven. 
  The regression equations reported below employ the same quarterly economic data as 
in Fielding (1999). The three political variables are reported only anually, so we construct 
quarterly interpolations using the method of Lisman and Sandee (1963). All of the economic 
variables appear to be I(0) except for ln(g), which appears to be I(1); so this variable appears in 
                         




the regression equations in first differences. Fedderke and Liu (1999) report tests for the order 
of integration of a range of the political variables from the Fedderke et al. (1999) paper. They 
cannot in any case reject the null that the series are I(1), but note that their tests have low 
power because of the many possible structural breaks that might have arisen in the political 
turbulence of Apartheid South Africa. In the regression equations below the political variables 
appear in first differences. Levels of the variables, when added to these regressions, have no 
explanatory power.2 
  Table 1 reports the results of estimating the revised capital stock equation by IV 
without any restrictions; it corresponds to Table 3 in Fielding (1999), with impact elasticities on 
explanatory variables reported above steady-state elasticities. As in the original version of the 
model nine lags of the dependent variable are included, and ln(c/P), ln(w/P) and ln(Q) are 
instrumented on their own lagged values. Comparison of the two tables shows that none of 
the coefficients in the original version of the model is significantly different from its 
counterpart in Table 1 below; t-ratios are slightly lower in the revised model, but this would 
not affect statistical inference if a generous confidence interval were used. The rank ordering 
of variables by the size of their coefficients is unchanged, and therefore the economic 
inferences presented in Fielding (1999) are robust to the inclusion of the political variables. All 
these remarks are still true if we estimate a restricted version of the model in which some 
variables are omitted so as to minimize the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion. This 
version is reported in Table 2, which corresponds to Table 4 of Fielding (1999). Recursive 
estimates of the model (available on request) indicate that there is no significant variation in 
the regression coefficients as the sample size changes. 
  Two of the three political variables are statistically significant at the 5% level: INS 
(political instability) and PRR (property rights). Increases in instability reduce the capital stock 
and improvements in property rights raise the capital stock. It is not possible at this degree of 
aggregation to determine whether these effects reflect a link between perceived investment 
risk and political instability / poor property rights, or whether these factors reduce the return 
to capital by inhibiting efficient capital allocation. Nevertheless, the political variables do 
explain some of the variation in the capital stock over time that was previously unexplained. 
  The estimated steady-state coefficent on the rate of growth of the PRR index is 0.408. 
This coefficient implies that changes in the property rights series have a marked impact on the 
capital stock. Between 1977 (the political low point of the Apartheid era) and 1997, PRR grew 
by 1.4% per quarter. The regression coefficient implies that during this transition period the 
steady-state capital stock was on average 0.57% higher than it would otherwise have been. 
This 0.57% is equivalent to 0.92 billion Rand at 1995 prices. Similarly, the regression coefficient 
on ∆INS (-0.27) implies that over the two years of the sharpest rise in the instability index (by 
around 3,000 points between 1985 and 1987) the steady-state capital stock was 1.02% lower 






                         
    2 The regression includes growth rates of POR  and  PRR; this is not possible for INS, which is 
sometimes equal to zero, so absolute changes in INS are used. 
    3 To put these numbers in context, the sample standard deviation of ∆ln(PRR) is 3.36%, and that of 





Table 1: Modified Capital Stock Equation (1): IV Estimates [1963(1)-1993(4)] 
 
Variable           Coeff.     Std. Err.    t ratio 
ln(Q)          0.06868      0.03935      1.745 
ln(c/P)             -0.03525      0.01451     -2.429 
ln(w/P)        -0.17026      0.10380     -1.640 
∆ln(g)          -0.06195      0.14937     -0.415 
[rB - rT]            -0.47088      0.17107     -2.753 
S(1)           0.54496      0.40911      1.332 
S(2)             0.09181      0.55716      0.165 
S(3)            -0.13181      0.69251     -0.190 
∆ln(POR)          0.02883      0.03033      0.951 
∆ln(PRR)          0.14752      0.06071      2.430 
∆INS*0.0001     -0.09797      0.04662     -2.101 
D(1)            0.01698      0.00920      1.845 
D(2)             0.01097      0.01006      1.090 
D(3)           0.00458      0.00723      0.634 
 
Solved long run equation 
Variable           Coeff.     Std. Err.    t ratio 
ln(Q)          0.1899       0.0939       2.022 
ln(c/P)             -0.0975       0.0496      -1.966 
ln(w/P)        -0.4709       0.2787      -1.690 
∆ln(g)          -0.1713       0.4143      -0.413 
[rB - rT]            -1.3020       0.5210      -2.499 
S(1)           1.5070       1.0910       1.381 
S(2)             0.2539       1.5340      -0.166 
S(3)            -0.3646       1.9280      -0.189 
∆ln(POR)          0.0797       0.0883       0.903 
∆ln(PRR)          0.4080       0.2022       2.018 
∆INS*0.0001     -0.2709       0.1482      -1.828 
D(1)            0.0470       0.0270       1.741 
D(2)             0.0303       0.0277       1.094 
D(3)           0.0127       0.0200       0.635 
 
IV specification test: χ•(24) = 28.755 [0.2295]  RSS = 0.0270 
LM residual autocorrelation (order 1): F(1,97) = 0.34524 [0.5582] 
LM residual autocorrelation (order 4): F(4,94) = 0.21256 [0.9309] 
LM Heteroscedasticity: F(47,50) = 0.85508 [0.7049]    
LM ARCH (order 1): F(1,96) = 1.0689 [0.3038] 
LM ARCH (order 4): F(4,90) = 0.6324 [0.6407] 





Table 2: Modified Capital Stock Equation (2): IV Estimates [1963(1)-1993(4)] 
 
Variable           Coeff.     Std. Err.    t ratio 
ln(Q)               0.08280      0.03465      2.390 
ln(c/P)           -0.03521      0.01391     -2.531 
ln(w/P)               -0.19252      0.09903     -1.944 
[rB - rT]               -0.51251      0.15287     -3.353 
S(1)           0.57288      0.33642      1.703 
∆ln(PRR)          0.14531      0.05816      2.498 
∆INS*0.0001       -0.07917      0.04214     -1.879 
D(1)             0.01389      0.00658      2.110 
D(2)             0.01159      0.00857      1.352 
D(3)            0.00321      0.00689      0.465 
 
Solved long run equation 
Variable           Coeff.     Std. Err.    t ratio 
ln(Q)          0.2214       0.0754       2.936 
ln(c/P)             -0.0942       0.0464      -2.032 
ln(w/P)        -0.5148       0.2553      -2.016 
[rB - rT]            -1.3700       0.4838      -2.832 
S(1)           1.5320       0.8179       1.873 
∆ln(PRR)          0.3886       0.1852       2.098 
∆INS*0.0001     -0.2117       0.1243      -1.703 
D(1)            0.0371       0.0185       2.005 
D(2)             0.0310       0.0226       1.372 
D(3)           0.0086       0.0184       0.467 
 
IV specification  test: χ•(28) = 30.102 [0.3584]  RSS = 0.0273 
LM residual autocorrelation (order 1): F(1,101) = 0.32229 [0.5715] 
LM residual autocorrelation (order 4): F(4,98) = 0.19753 [0.9391] 
LM Heteroscedasticity: F(39,62) = 1.1438 [0.3132] 
LM ARCH (order 1): F(1,100) = 1.2568 [0.2649] 
LM ARCH (order 4): F(4,94) = 0.7291 [0.5743] 





We have shown that manufacturing investment in South Africa is highly sensitive to time-
varying measures of the state of the South African polity, as well as to indicators of economic 
uncertainty. The addition of the political variables does not alter previous conclusions about 
the economic determinants of investment, but the political factors do explain some of the 
variance in investment performance over time that was previously unexplained. During the 
period of political liberalization South African investment performance has been better than 
could otherwise have been expected. 
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